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 Abstract 
 
A number of proposals today support a substantial increase in foreign aid levels to sub-
Saharan Africa even though this region already receives a historically unprecedented 
volume of aid. This essay reviews the evidence regarding the potentially negative effects of 
aid dependence on state institutions, a topic which has received relatively little attention.  
We note several pathways through which political institutions might be adversely affected 
and devote particular attention to fiscal and state revenue issues.  In addition to reviewing 
the economic literature on the aid-revenue relationship, this essay brings in the long-
standing political science literature on state-building to consider the potential impact of aid 
dependence on the relationship between state and citizen.  We conclude that states which 
can raise a substantial proportion of their revenues from the international community are 
less accountable to their citizens and under less pressure to maintain popular legitimacy. 
They are therefore less likely to have the incentives to cultivate and invest in effective 
public institutions.  As a result, substantial increases in aid inflows over a sustained period 
could have a harmful effect on institutional development in sub-Saharan Africa. 
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“The importance of public revenue to the underdeveloped countries can hardly be 
exaggerated if they are to achieve their hopes of accelerated progress.” 
 
 -Nicolas Kaldor, Foreign Affairs, January 1963.   
 
 
“I have made revenue collection a frontline institution because it is the one which can 
emancipate us from begging, from disturbing friends… if we can get about 22 percent of 
GDP we should not need to disturb anybody by asking for aid….instead of coming here 
to bother you, give me this, give me this, I shall come here to greet you, to trade with 
you.”  
 
-Yoweri Museveni, President of Uganda (which collects 11% of GDP in taxes and receives a 
further 11% of GDP in aid), Washington DC, September 21, 2005. 
 
 
 
1.  Introduction 
 
After a crisis of legitimacy throughout the 1990s, aid is popular again in the policy 
community.  Several new studies have suggested that at least a doubling of overseas 
development assistance (ODA) from 2000 levels is necessary as a precondition for 
meeting international development targets (Zedillo Panel 2001; Devarajan et al. 2002).  
The Commission for Africa (2005) chaired by British Prime Minister Tony Blair called 
for an immediate $25 billion increase in aid to sub-Saharan Africa, with an additional $25 
billion to come by 2015.  This would constitute roughly a tripling of aid to the continent.  
Further, the UN’s Millennium Project (2005) has estimated that global ODA will need to 
rise even further than the previous estimates, reaching at least $195 billion by 2015 from 
current levels of some $79 billion in 2004.  These calls for more ODA are echoed in 
various parts of the United Nations system, the World Bank, many NGOs, recipient 
countries, and even some European governments.    
 
Many of the low-income countries targeted for substantial increases in aid already receive 
historically unprecedented flows.  For instance, ODA to sub-Saharan Africa was the 
equivalent of 11.7 percent of the continent’s GNI in 2003 (excluding Nigeria and South 
Africa).2  Exactly half of the region’s 46 countries with data for 2003 received in excess 
of 10 percent of GNI in ODA, and 11 received more than 20 percent.  Globally, there is a 
core set of roughly three dozen countries that have received a tenth of GNI or more in aid 
for at least the last two decades.  This is a lengthy time period for receiving sizeable aid 
with few historical precedents. The large flows to Europe during the Marshall Plan lasted 
only a few years and never exceeded 3 percent of GDP of any receiving country (De 
Long and Eichengreen, 1991; O’Connell and Soludo, 2001).  While substantial US 
support during the early Cold War to allies such as Korea and Taiwan tapered off within 
a decade, contemporary aid ratios in these three dozen countries has tended not to recede, 
                                                 
2  Including South Africa and Nigeria, two large economies that receive very little aid, brings this 
proportion down to 5.7 percent of GNI (WDI, 2005). 
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but to grow larger over three decades.  Moreover, if the large increases in aid proposed 
actually materialize, aid ratios will rise substantially further and the number of countries 
crossing the 10 percent threshold will grow significantly (Moss and Subramanian, 2005). 
 
Skepticism about the desirability of such aid increases has tended to emphasize economic 
and management issues.  Some observers have expressed concerns about the capacity of 
low-income states to absorb large new flows in addition to the flows they already receive, 
and have pointed to the weak management capacities of governments, the dearth of good 
new projects and programs to fund, or the ambiguous association between aid and 
measurable development outcomes (White, 1998; Burnside and Dollar, 2000).  Other 
observers have worried about the macro-economic impact of large aid increases; they 
have pointed to “Dutch disease” effects on small economies (see for example Heller, 
2005, Rajan and Subramanian, 2005).  Relatively less critical attention has been paid to 
the potential effects of large increases in aid on public institutions in low-income 
countries.    
 
Yet institutional issues have recently returned to the foreground in debates on economic 
development.  The critical importance of sound public institutions to the development 
process has become an article of faith, not only among political scientists (for example, 
Herbst, 1990, Haggard, 1990; Evans 1995), who could be supposed to have professional 
reasons to argue for the importance of institutions, but also has emerged more recently as 
a consensus among economists (for example, Rodrik, 2003; Ndulu and O’Connell, 1999; 
Acemoglu et al., 2004).  Sachs’ (2005) view that good institutions are entirely a result of 
development, rather than their cause, is now a minority view. 
 
Aid is thought to work best in environments with high quality public institutions, 
presumably as part of a capable ‘developmental’ state (among a large literature see 
Burnside and Dollar, 2000; World Bank, 1998).  Increasingly, measures of institutions 
are an explicit factor for aid disbursement and allocation. Thus, ‘institutional 
development’ is frequently an independent variable thought to affect the efficiency of aid, 
and thus a legitimate factor in selecting aid recipients and determining allocation 
strategies.  This suggests that aid should be “selectively” focused on countries that are 
thought to most effectively use resources to engage in poverty reduction.  Such logic 
underlies IDA’s performance-based allocation process and the Millennium Challenge 
Account, a new US aid program that explicitly targets assistance to countries that are 
thought best able to use additional resources (Radelet, 2003). 
 
In many respects, this new approach is at odds with the more traditional argument that 
one of the primary purposes of aid (if not its most important) should be to build effective 
indigenous public institutions.  By this formulation, institutional development is thought 
to be a dependent variable, affected by targeted aid.  In contrast to the ‘selectivity’ 
philosophy, this older doctrine has been to channel aid instead to places with the greatest 
need for improved public institutions with the idea that aid itself will help to improve the 
institutional environment.  This approach underlies growing donor efforts at so-called 
‘capacity building’ and the ‘big push’ on aid first popular in the 1950s and 1960s and 
now advocated by the UN and others (Easterly, 2005).  The Commission for Africa report 
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wavers back and forth between these two views of aid and institutions.  It recognizes the 
importance of good institutions to making aid effective, in part because it argues that 
improved institutions will allow absorption of the much larger aid flows it advocates.  
But it also believes that these large increases can serve to leverage a much greater 
commitment on the part of African governments to improving the domestic institutions 
important to growth and poverty reduction. 
 
Does aid necessarily help to develop public institutions and state capacity, or can there be 
an aid-institutions paradox?  In this essay, we review an emerging literature that explores 
the potential effects of large amounts of aid on institutional development, including some 
of the most basic functions of the state such as the ability to collect revenues.  Given the 
current debates regarding large new infusions of additional aid, an analysis of the 
institutional effects of aid is particularly timely.  Because Africa presents the greatest 
challenges to development, and is the region most aid dependent, we especially look at 
the aid-institutions relationship in that region.  Many political scientists now argue that 
public institutions in the region are poorly suited to promote economic development 
because of neo-patrimonial tendencies (Callaghy, 1988; Sandbrook, 1992; Chabal and 
Daloz, 1999; van de Walle, 2001).  In the poorly integrated and fragmented states of the 
region, political leaders have relied on systematic clientelism and the private 
appropriation of state resources for political ends.  As a result, government resources 
have not been utilized primarily to promote economic development, as political elites 
have acted in a predatory fashion to maintain themselves in power.  There are other 
reasons for which the economies of sub-Saharan Africa have failed to gain economic 
development, but it is now widely conceded that these political dynamics have 
constituted a significant brake on growth.  As a result, it is thus possible that inflows of 
external resources like aid could be a disincentive to state transformation.  Does aid 
encourage the transition from patrimonialism and predation to rational developmental 
states?  
 
It is far from impossible that certain types of aid could undermine long-term institutional 
development, despite donors’ sincere intentions.  Such a paradox is, of course, not new to 
the development literature.  The so called ‘resource curse’ has long posited that unearned 
income undermines incentives to build local institutions and perhaps a social contract 
with the population (see Ross, 1999 for an excellent review; Karl, 1997; Birdsall and 
Subramanian, 2004).  Natural resources represent an unearned rent accruing to 
governments; it is argued that this rent can have a negative and anti-developmental effect 
on the economy, public institutions, and even on the government’s relationship with the 
citizenry.   We will argue that aid can have many of the same dysfunctional effects as 
natural resources; that is, there can be an ‘aid curse’ as well that might create perverse 
incentives and lead to anti-developmental outcomes.   
 
To analyze these issues, this review essay seeks to integrate two disciplinary literatures 
that have too long ignored each other. On the whole, political scientists have been 
remarkably oblivious to the political dynamics created by foreign aid, particularly in low-
income countries where it is today the leading sector of economic activity and might thus 
be thought to have a significant impact on the local political economy.  For their part, 
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economists have mostly ignored a long tradition in the political science literature which 
establishes a historical link between the state’s revenues and its political and institutional 
attributes.  The following section lays out the context for these questions, and explains 
why they are particularly relevant for today’s debates about aid and development.  
Section 3 reviews the well-known macro-economic effects of large volumes of aid, and 
focuses on the institutional implications of these effects.  Section 4 explores the potential 
negative effects of large aid flows on institution building through its effect on local 
bureaucratic and policy-making dynamics.  Section 5 then examines the literature on state 
revenues and its relationship to foreign aid.  The historical linkages between state revenue 
collection and state-building are considered in Section 6.  A theme that emerges in the 
second half of the essay is the low quality of the available data on state revenues, 
particularly for Africa.  At present, data deficiencies unfortunately prevent the formal 
empirical testing of many of the hypotheses developed in the essay.  Nonetheless, the 
possibility of the existence of an “aid-institutions paradox” is significant, and Section 7 
discusses the policy implications of our findings before concluding.   
 
 
2.  Aid and the development debates 
 
Aid clearly can be useful and has certainly contributed to economic development and 
improvements in quality of life variables in many countries.  Evidence for successful aid 
is particularly strong in targeted programs with defined objectives (see Levine 2004 for 
examples in global public health).  But, at the same time, and especially at very high 
levels over a sustained period, aid could also have distorting effects on some of the very 
outcomes donors hope to encourage through aid, such as policy ownership, fiscal 
sustainability, institutional development, and, ultimately, autonomous long-term 
economic growth. 
 
One way to consider this problem is to think of aid as a subsidy.  As such, aid is supposed 
to provide temporary financial assistance in order to encourage certain long-term 
behaviors:  revenue collection, investment in physical and human capital, and the 
establishment of the institutions of a developmental state.  There are clearly some cases 
where aid-as-subsidy has played this role, for example in South Korea or Botswana, 
where foreign assistance supported local efforts to do these things and the country 
gradually was weaned off aid.  At the same time, there are many, indeed dozens, of other 
cases where aid is neither temporary, nor seeming to assist countries in fulfilling these 
roles.  Instead, it could be argued that the subsidy has in fact discouraged revenue 
collection, distorted expenditure decision-making, and undermined the incentives to build 
state capacity.  In these cases, aid could be viewed as not only a crutch delaying 
institutional development, but as potentially undercutting those efforts. 
 
This possibility of harmful aid dynamics seems particularly acute in sub-Saharan Africa, 
where some countries have now entered into their third and fourth decades of receiving 
substantial volumes of aid.  Much of this aid has also included explicit capacity building 
technical assistance from donors.  The World Bank alone provided Africa with 70 civil 
service reform projects between 1987 and 1997, for instance (Levy and Kpundeh, 2005, p. 
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v), while a recent internal Bank evaluation estimates that over a quarter of all Bank 
credits to the region is explicitly devoted to capacity building (OED 2005, p. 9).  
Technical assistance to central banks seems to have been successful in building 
institutional capacity, but such examples appear more the exception than the rule.  Many 
experts argue that state capacity has improved little during this period, and point to 
specific cases of clear decline (see van de Walle 2001; 2005). 
 
In some cases, the lack of progress on capacity building can be attributed to political 
instability.  After all, at any given time in the last three decades, over a dozen economies 
in the region have been subject to violent civil conflict (see for example Collier, 2005) 
and the emergence of warlord rule in the context of the collapse of the central state (Reno, 
1998).  Long periods of political stress, conflict and state collapse, continue to have a 
significant impact on state capacity, even after the return to political stability because of 
their long-term institutional effects, notably on the supply of trained manpower.   Perhaps 
more striking is the slow pace of institution-building in relatively stable political systems.  
Indeed, a substantial literature has documented the pervasive weakness of the central 
state in sub-Saharan Africa, which often exercises weak if any effective sovereignty over 
much of its territory, and has less legitimacy than a variety of sub-national and private 
governance structures that compete with it for popular support (Herbst, 2000; Englebert, 
2000; Jackson and Rotberg, 1982).  It has become fashionable in the donor community to 
blame this surprisingly slow pace of state capacity building on the nature of African 
bureaucracies, which are argued to be patrimonial and corrupt, and thus not particularly 
interested in the provision of public goods essential to development (Levy and Kpundeh, 
2005; OED, 2005).  But even if one accepts this diagnostic, the question remains, why 
has the large volume of aid devoted to capacity building not had a bigger impact on 
improving these public institutions, and transforming them into, using the Weberian 
terminology, more ‘rational-legal’ bureaucracies?  
 
  
3.  Aid, fiscal policy, and macroeconomic outcomes 
 
A number of potential negative effects of large aid volumes on institutional development 
can be identified.  Much of the focus from economists has been on macroeconomic 
imbalances caused by large volumes of aid.  One central issue has been the possibility of 
large ODA inflows affecting the real exchange rate and undermining the competitiveness 
of the export sector— the so called ‘Dutch disease’ (most recently, see Rajan and 
Subramanian, 2005).  Management of the real exchange rate is arguably rendered even 
more difficult by ODA volatility, which also is thought to have negative effects (see 
below).  Dutch disease-type effects have been noted in a number of African aid recipients 
(see Younger, 1992 on Ghana; Adam and Bevan 2003).  Experiences from Uganda 
(Atingi-Ego, 2005; Nkusu, 2004) and other countries suggest that an active central bank 
can manage these exchange rate appreciations and, for the most part, mitigate pernicious 
effects on competitiveness, but nonetheless,  a number of country episodes suggests that 
in fact a large volume of aid can and does undermine competitiveness. 
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Another set of economic concerns emphasize the role of aid within the budget process 
itself, with most studies suggesting that foreign aid can undermine the ability of recipient 
governments to budget appropriately.  Several have implicated the volatility of aid flows 
as the source of distortions.  In a 37-country survey, Bulir and Lane (2002) found that aid 
is more volatile than domestic fiscal revenues and that this volatility lessens any potential 
positive benefits of aid on recipients.  McGillivray and Morrisey (2000b) found the 
volatility of aid often leads to poor budgeting and underestimation of revenues, 
particularly since aid commitments tend to overestimate actual disbursements.  Similarly, 
Heller and Gupta (2002) argue that the fiscal uncertainty of dependence on external 
assistance makes long-term planning extremely difficult.  
 
Beyond volatility, there have also been some questions about perverse incentives of aid 
on the process of economic policymaking.  Brautigam and Knack (2004), for example, 
found that high levels of aid serve as a “soft budget constraint”:  the access to foreign 
resources convinces decision makers that budgets are flexible and encourages fiscal 
indiscipline.  Two case studies looking at Ghana found that as donor financing increased, 
so did disparities between budgeted expenditures and actual spending, suggesting that the 
budget process was increasingly directed toward satisfying external donors rather than 
reflecting actual public spending preferences.  Killick (2004) thus described Ghana’s 
“budgetary façade” and Pradhan (1996) similarly called the budget a “deceptive mirage”, 
in which aid was distorting both the budget process itself and the government’s 
‘ownership’ of the country’s purported development agenda. 
 
A number of observers have examined the impact of large volumes of aid on the mix of 
public expenditure and the overall spending levels.  A number of papers suggest that aid 
results in excessive and unsustainable levels of government consumption, also leading 
potentially to macro-imbalances.   Khan and Hoshino (1992) found aid to be generally 
treated as an increase in income leading to higher government consumption, but that the 
some public investment is also financed by aid.  In a broad literature review, McGillvray 
and Morrissey (2000a) found that aid tends to be associated with government spending 
increases in excess of the value of the aid, although there is no clear answer on the impact 
of aid on consumption versus investment.  This was reinforced in McGillvray and 
Morrissey (2000b) where they concluded that aid leads to increases in expenditure not 
financed by the corresponding increase in revenue.  More recently, Remmer (2004) also 
found that aid leads to overall increases in government spending.   
 
How might these possible macro effects of aid negatively impact public institutions?  The 
potential loss of competitiveness means lower exports and economic growth, fewer jobs, 
and increased dependence on external assistance.  Resource volatility contributes to 
macro-economic instability, which complicates public policy making in vital areas such 
as budgeting and planning, and tilt public spending toward consumption rather than 
investment.  These can exact a negative effect on the quality of the civil service, public 
services, and infrastructure, all indirectly undermining the ability of the state to transition 
from patrimonialism to a more ‘developmental’ path.   
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The rest of this paper addresses more direct and, we argue, more significant but less well-
documented negative institutional effects of large volumes of aid.  Much of the literature 
cited in this section describes dysfunctional economic outcomes but does not really 
explain them.  To do so, we need to turn to institutional factors, which we begin to do in 
the next section. 
 
 
4.  Donor practices and institutional change 
 
In addition to macroeconomic and fiscal effects, there are costs of aid related to the 
structures, practices, and procedures of the current international aid system. These 
include a longstanding and well-known list of common complaints about aid: volatility 
and uncertainty of ODA flows; fragmentation of donor efforts; project proliferation and 
duplication; conflicting or dominant donor agendas; competition for staff; and high 
administrative and oversight costs (Among many, see Cohen, 1992; Berg, 1993; 
Brautigam and Knack, 2004; Knack and Rahman, 2004; van de Walle, 2005).  Birdsall 
(2004) lists many of these as the “seven deadly sins” of the aid business.  Such practices 
are argued to have substantial costs for public administration.  For instance, the 
proliferation of donors and projects constitute a substantial burden for the small number 
of qualified public officials, who spend much of their time attending to donor concerns 
and managing aid activities rather than promoting the development of the country—that 
is, when they do not exit altogether from the civil service to go work for better wages in 
donor and NGO organizations.  Management of donor visits (“missions”) became such a 
problem in Tanzania, that the country was forced to declare a ‘mission holiday’, a four-
month period when they take a break from visiting delegations to focus on budget 
preparation.  Similarly, aid volatility and project proliferation complicate effective 
government control over budgets and development planning.  Much, if not most, aid is 
not integrated into national budgets, thus posing real sustainability problems, and they are 
often implemented through parallel structures that cream the best staff from the civil 
service, and make government coordination of policy much more difficult.  
 
Far from helping to develop effective state bureaucracies, certain aid practices can in fact 
serve to reinforce the patrimonial element within recipient governments at the expense of 
the legal-rational.  Projects provide for the allocation of all sorts of discretionary goods to 
be politicized and patrimonialized, including expensive four-wheels drive cars, 
scholarships, decisions over where to place schools and roads, and so on.  The common 
practice of paying cash ‘sitting fees’ for civil servants attending donor-funded workshops, 
where the daily rates can exceed regular monthly salaries, even turns training into a rent 
to be distributed. More broadly, when donor projects are poorly integrated into national 
budgetary processes, and not subject to much transparency or effective control, it is 
argued, they help sustain anti-developmental practices within the state apparatus.  
Because local officials are not included in policy planning, they often come to view aid 
projects as little more than a set of scarce private goods to be allocated.  Aid dependence 
thus leads to a situation in which bureaucrats are often not rewarded for focusing on their 
core developmental functions but rather on getting money from donors. Technocrats, who 
are specialized in budget management and/or planning, say, are less rewarded than 
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bureaucrats who are adept at interacting with donor organizations and accessing their 
resources.  If these two are not part of the same skill set, the wrong kind of individual 
expertise may be rewarded and over time, real developmental capacities may atrophy 
within the administration.  
 
Particularly pernicious for state institutions in Africa has been the combination of high 
aid flows and economic crisis, both sustained over a long period of time.  As 
development policy has come to be dominated by repeated fiscal crises and driven by 
short-term adjustment and debt management, the patrimonial attraction of aid resources 
has been accentuated.  In countries where power means access to state privileges and 
rents,  and political systems are sustained by complex clientelist relationships, aid and the 
scarce goods it provides become all the more desirable for the political management of 
economic crises (van de Walle, 2001).  In short, states who find it difficult to meet civil 
service payrolls are more likely to politicize aid funded sitting fees, per diems and 
scholarships to study abroad.  Indeed, they will endeavor to turn aid into a mechanism to 
increase government consumption rather than public investment.  
 
It also seems reasonable to surmise that the larger the relative aid flows, the more these 
problems are likely to be exacerbated.  In many countries of sub-Saharan Africa, aid 
flows are such that aid dynamics simply dominate local development efforts.  Moss and 
Subramanian (2005) identify 22 low-income countries, 16 of which are in sub-Saharan 
Africa where ODA inflows are equivalent to at least half of total government expenditure.  
In twelve poor countries, of which ten are African, the ratio of ODA to government 
expenditure was 75 percent or more.  Looking at a slightly earlier period, Brautigam and 
Knack (2004) find roughly similar numbers of aid intensity.   
 
Because most of the concerns listed in this section are directly related to the way in which 
aid is delivered and administered, in theory at least, many of these are fixable through 
changes on the donor side.  These shortfalls have long been identified and some efforts 
are underway to address them, such as donor pooling or using budget support instead of 
project aid (Eifert and Gelb, 2005).  There are also several large institutional attempts to 
improve the efficiency of aid delivery, such as various programs by the OECD’s 
Development Assistance Committee or the Paris High Level Forum on Aid 
Harmonization and Alignment.  In practice, however, these inefficiencies exist because of 
very real political or bureaucratic constraints, and progress in reducing them has proven 
to be slow and uneven.  In many ways, these problems seem to be actually getting worse; 
for instance, the number of distinct projects funded by donors has nearly tripled since 
1995 (Roodman, forthcoming).  
 
Perhaps most worrying, there appear to be few incentives for either donors or recipients 
to change their practices.  As Brautigam and Knack (2004) argue, “political elites have 
little incentive to change a situation in which large amounts of aid provide exceptional 
resources for patronage and many fringe benefits” (2004, p. 263). Moreover, until very 
recently, the government’s performance did not appear to affect whether or not it 
received aid, so there appeared to be little or no cost to misusing aid.  Alesina and Weder 
(2002) actually find that high levels of corruption within recipient countries were 
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positively correlated with aid flows through out the 1990s.  On the other hand, incentives 
to improve aid effectiveness appear less important within donor organizations than other 
concerns, related to bureaucratic incentives within aid agencies, and to the importance of 
commercial, foreign policy and ideological objectives on the part of donor governments 
(Easterly, 2003).  
 
 
5.  The aid-revenue relationship 
 
A third institutional effect of aid that has been posited in the literature concerns its impact 
on state revenues. This is an important issue since the ability of the state to collect 
revenues is critically linked to state capacity, while the central role of revenue collection 
in political development and state-building has long been accepted.  Schumpeter was 
perhaps the first to argue that a country’s tax system fundamentally reflects its political 
institutions (Schumpeter, 1918/1991).  Reliance on citizens for raising public revenues, as 
opposed to unearned income via offshore extraction or external assistance, is considered 
an essential ingredient to establishing accountability between the state and society.   
 
The contemporary literature suggests that taxation is a useful indicator of state capacity.  
Because revenues are necessary to fund the state’s activities in a sustainable manner, the 
size and consistency of government revenues can tell us a lot about the level of capacity 
that exists within the state apparatus.   This has long been argued in the aid literature.  
According to Kaldor (1963), the key determination of whether a state moves from aid 
dependency to economic self-sufficiency is the degree to which the state learns how to 
tax, thereby leading to a lessening of the need for aid.  According to Bauer (1976), 
foreign aid displaces the processes of institutional maturation essential to development, 
including the capacity of the state to collect revenue.  Azam et al. (1999) arrive at a 
similar conclusion, claiming that the ability of a state to remove itself from reliance on 
aid will depend on the degree to which the state engages in learning-by-doing in the 
public sector, a process that is greatly affected by the level of aid in relation to overall 
revenue and the initial institutional conditions. 
 
Early empirical tax effort studies focused on a small set of variables considered the main 
determinants of tax effort, most commonly measured as tax revenue as a share of GDP 
(Lotz and Morrs, 1967; Celliah, 1971, Celliah et al. 1975; Tanzi, 1981).  The tax effort 
literature typically considers the level of development and the economic structure as 
primary determinants of tax shares: GDP per capita, the degree of openness of the 
economy, the agricultural and/or industrial share of GDP, and in some cases population 
growth (Tanzi, 1992; Leuthold 1991; Stotsky and WoldeMariam, 1997; Ghura 1998).   
 
In the tax effort literature, foreign aid is generally expected to reduce tax shares since aid 
provides an alternative, non-earned source of revenue for governments in addition to tax 
revenue (Ghura, 1998; Remmer, 2004; Brautigam and Knack, 2004).  Consequently, a 
government that receives significant amounts of aid is thought to have less incentive to 
tax and improve its tax administration.  That is, foreign aid may be used as a substitute 
for domestic revenue mobilization whilst allowing the same level of expenditure (Heller, 
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1975; Kimbrough, 1986).  Not only may aid inflows lead to lower tax effort, but they 
may also slow down the development of domestic institutions such as the tax 
administration in recipient countries (Brautigam and Knack, 2004).   
 
A negative relationship between tax revenue and aid is certainly suggested by Figure 1 
that shows the four-year averages of tax revenue (excluding trade taxes) as a share of 
GDP against the four-year averages of aid as a share of GNI for 55 low and lower middle 
income countries for 1972-1999, using the standard IMF data on government finances.  
The point of this figure is merely to show the simple correlation between tax collection 
and aid receipts.  There are many cases of low aid and low tax (those toward the bottom 
left).   There are also a moderate number of high aid and low tax (bottom right) and low 
aid-high tax countries (upper left).  However, there are no incidences at all of high aid 
(>10% of GNI) and high tax (>18% of GDP).  These thresholds are of course arbitrary 
and the figure does not imply any causation, but it does indicate that based on historical 
experience, high levels of both do not occur at the same time. 
 
Figure 1 
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Sources: GFS (2004); WDI (2005) and authors’ calculations. 
 
What is the econometric evidence on behalf of this relationship?   It is actually more 
ambiguous than one might think.  Leuthold (1991) examines the effect of the standard 
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variables, controlling for the economic structure and the level of development, and aid on 
tax revenue using panel data.  All the standard variables are statistically significant and 
have the anticipated signs, whereas foreign aid has the expected negative sign but is not 
significant.  Using data from Stotsky and WoldeMariam (1997), Brautigam (2000, p. 48) 
found that 71 percent of the African countries with aid/GDP above 10 percent in 1995 
had lower than expected tax effort.  Ghura (1998) examined the determinants of tax 
revenue for 39 sub-Saharan African countries between 1985 and 1996 and found foreign 
aid to have a significant, negative impact on tax shares.  Teera and Hudson (2004) use 
data for 116 developed and developing countries for 1975-1998, but find aid to be 
insignificant.  A panel study of 120 middle- and low-income countries over the period 
1970-1999 by Remmer (2004) finds that aid dependency reduces tax revenue 
mobilization.  The dependent variable is the change in tax revenue as a share of GDP, and 
the explanatory variables include the standard variables and three different measures of 
aid dependency (aid/GNI, aid/government expenditures, and aid/imports).  All three aid 
dependency measures are negatively related to tax shares although only aid as a share of 
imports is significant.  When reducing the sample to the period 1980-1999, both the aid 
share in imports and the aid share in government expenditures have a significant negative 
impact on tax effort.  
 
One of the most recent studies focusing on the revenue response to foreign aid inflows 
separates total net aid into grants and loans to test if the impact of grants on domestic 
revenue is different from that of (concessional) loans (Gupta et al. 2004).  This study 
suggests that some governments may consider grants to be a free substitute for tax 
revenue.  By contrast, loans must be repaid, which provides incentives for governments 
to at least maintain tax revenues at current levels if not to increase them (Brautigam, 
2000).  Gupta et al. use the standard variables controlling for the economic structure and 
level of development in a panel of 107 developing countries over the period 1970-2002, 
but augment the model by adding grants and loans separately and a corruption variable 
(the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) corruption index), to test their separate 
impact on the aid-revenue relationship.  In their baseline regression the overall effect of 
total aid (grants and loans) on domestic revenue is negative and significant.  When total 
aid is split into grants and loans, grants have a significant, negative effect on revenue 
while loans have a significant, positive impact.  In their extended model, corruption is 
found to reduce revenue.  To further test the negative effect of corruption on revenues, 
Gupta et al. rank countries according to their score on the ICRG corruption index and test 
the impact of grants versus loans on revenues in a sample consisting of the relatively 
corrupt countries.  Their results suggest that countries with weaker institutions are likely 
to suffer a larger negative impact of grants on revenue than countries with better 
institutions.  
 
In addition to the cross-sectional time-series studies there are several country case studies 
for which the results are more mixed.  A negative relationship between aid and domestic 
revenue mobilization was found in Pakistan (Franco-Rodriguez et al., 1998), Zambia 
(Fagernas and Roberts, 2004a) and Cote d’Ivoire (McGillivray and Outtara, 2003).  By 
contrast, a positive relationship between aid and revenue collection was found in 
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Indonesia (Pack and Pack, 1990), Ghana (Osei et al, 2003), and Uganda and Malawi 
(Fagernas and Roberts, 2004b, 2004c). 
 
Generally, thus, the literature finds a negative relationship between aid and revenue 
collection, but this is not a conclusive result.  For all of the studies, there are considerable 
concerns about the quality of the data and also the sensitivity of the results to 
specification changes, which make firm causal conclusions about the aid-revenue 
relationship impossible.  Nevertheless, the typical explanatory channels are the 
replacement of tax with aid in the short term and the disincentives and moral hazard 
faced by aid-dependent governments to build tax administration and institutional capacity 
over the long-term.   
 
To further test the hypothesis that there is a negative causal relationship between high 
levels of aid and domestic tax effort, we would need reliable revenue data for a broad 
range of countries over an extended time period.  Ideally, we would also have 
disaggregated revenue data to be able to strip out the possible differential effects of aid 
on trade taxes versus direct taxation and other forms of revenue collection.  This would 
allow us to isolate the revenues which require more state capacity to collect. 
Unfortunately, much of this data does not exist, especially for the set of countries that 
have been highly aid-dependent (indeed, the lack of data itself suggests capacity gaps).  
In addition to data shortages, much of the existing fiscal data is of extremely poor quality, 
particularly among low-income countries.  This limits our ability to empirically analyze 
the hypothesis with any degree of confidence and of course also raises caution about 
drawing firm conclusions from any of the data-driven assessments.3  
 
To summarize this section: a clear bivariate relationship appears to exist between high 
levels of aid and low levels of taxation.  Poor data quality do not, however, allow us 
complete confidence that this relationship is not confounded by other factors that high 
aid-dependent countries have in common, such as low levels of economic activity and 
industrialization, that are also associated with poor revenue extraction.  In addition, it is 
very hard to establish the exact nature of the link between state capacity and levels of 
state revenue.  Intuitively, revenue generation is so central to state survival that one 
would think that states would not voluntarily abstain from collecting revenues it was able 
to collect.  However, it is not completely possible to reject the alternative hypothesis that 
states choose not to seek revenues they have the capacity to collect because they are able 
to receive the equivalent revenues from foreign aid.  To gain insights into this issue, it is 
perhaps useful to turn to an older political science literature on state building, which 
explores the impact of revenue collection on regime type.   
 
 
6. Aid, Accountability, and the Political Regime  
 
A political regime can be defined as the set of institutions which determine the nature of 
political power, and which structures the relationship between the government and the 
                                                 
3 Including the data used in Figure 1.  Some of the studies cited above appear to have benefited from access 
to privileged data from within the IMF that is presumably of higher quality but is not publicly available. 
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citizenry.  A third and perhaps most critical set of negative institutional effects of aid can 
be identified as those that influence the political regime in a way that discourages the 
establishment of rational developmental states.  The hypothesis here is that large 
sustained aid flows fundamentally alter the relationship between government elites and 
local citizens.  Any kind of external financial flow changes the incentives faced by 
recipient government officials and their citizens, regardless of the precise nature of donor 
practices.  That is, aid flows themselves, separate from particular inefficiencies in the aid 
system, can affect the evolution of state-society relations.  If donors are providing the 
majority of public finance and governments are primarily accountable to those external 
agencies, then it may simply not be possible to also expect a credible social contract to 
develop between the state and its citizens.  Using the current terminology, aid may 
undercut the very principles the aid industry intends to promote: ownership, 
accountability, and participation. 
 
Large aid flows can result in a reduction in governmental accountability because 
governing elites no longer need to ensure the support of their publics and the assent of 
their legislatures when they do not need to raise revenues from the local economy, as 
long as they keep the donors happy and willing to provide alternative sources of funding.  
Although governments typically complain about conditions, it is still easier to manage 
donor demands than the slow and politically difficult task of building or improving 
domestic revenue collection.  A reliance on aid as a substitute for local resources means 
the flow of revenues to the state is not affected by government efficiency, so there will be 
a tendency for governments to underinvest in developmental capacity.  This moral 
hazard  effect of aid dependence is borne out empirically, as high aid is associated with 
decreased quality of governance (for example, Brautigam and Knack, 2004; Knack, 
2000).  Heller and Gupta (2002) also argue that aid creates moral hazard because it 
reduces the incentive to adopt good policies and reform inefficient institutions, and thus 
weakens the government’s developmental performance and encourages rent-seeking. 
 
The link between the loss of accountability and aid is particularly striking in Africa since 
the region combines sharp economic decline with a relatively high level of political 
stability, at least if the latter is defined as the ability of office holders to remain in power.  
Thus, since 1980, the average African leader has remained in power just under 12 years, 
more than three times longer than democratically elected leaders in the prosperous 
democracies of the West (van de Walle, 2001). The absence of accountability is then not 
a manner of speech, but a practical reality: it is literally true that African governments 
avoid accountability for their performance.  
 
A long-term decline in governmental accountability also appears to have a direct impact 
on the degree of democracy prevailing in the system.  Qualitatively, Moore (1998) has 
argued that countries which rely on a greater proportion of ‘unearned’ income will tend to 
be less democratic and have less effective institutional mechanisms and accountability. 
Simply put, the actions of such governments typically indicate they do not have to worry 
as much about maintaining legitimacy because they do not collect revenues from their 
own population.  Guyer (1992) and others have made exactly such an argument about 
Nigeria, while more recently the negative links between aid dependency and low levels of 
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democratic rule have been argued in a number of country case studies (see Hoffman and 
Gibson, 2005 on Tanzania; Hanlon, 1991 on Mozambique).  In these dynamics, aid can 
be compared with a natural resource, such as oil, that provides unearned rents for the 
government.  An earlier literature on ‘rentier’ states in the Middle East had indeed argued 
that oil resources have allowed governments to resist pressures to democratize (Anderson, 
1987; Chaudhry, 1997).   
 
Of course, it might be argued that aid comes with more strings attached than oil, and that 
donors can affect governmental behavior by setting conditions on their aid.  However 
imperfectly, donors do not condone government corruption, incompetence or 
authoritarianism. Though inconsistently, donors have promoted democracy and better 
governance in Africa, at least since the end of the Cold War (van de Walle, 2001).  
Donors have also sought to explicitly promote accountability and participation, using 
intensified oversight of accounts and conditionality, such as the insistence on a poverty 
reduction strategy paper (PRSP) process, which subjects the national budget to multiple 
rounds of consultation with civil society groups.  But the PRSPs and conditionality, and 
other donor processes (even if better enforced), cannot fundamentally replace 
government accountability towards its citizens in an equally legitimate way, no matter 
how well-intentioned or vigilant the donors.   
 
A large flow of aid over a sustained period also can undermine popular participation.  On 
the one hand, the assent of the population is less important to governments that receive 
large amounts of external support.  They will devote less time and resources to explaining 
and defending policy decisions to their citizens, and will underfund the kinds of public 
institutions that encourage popular participation.  On the other hand, the decline in 
ownership brought about by the externalization of decision-making necessarily results in 
departicipation.  If citizens believe that their leaders respond to pressures from London, 
Paris or Washington, they will not devote as much time pressing demands on the local 
legislature and executive.  More to the point, they may view the local legislature as the 
place to press for favors and patronage, rather than for policy outcomes, and this will 
once again tend to reinforce the patrimonial elements in the local political economy. 
 
The African contemporary record is certainly compatible with such an interpretation.  
The region is characterized by strong presidential rule, as well as weak and pliant 
legislatures (van de Walle, 2001; Joseph, 2003; Barkan and Gibson, 2005), and frail civil 
society organizations.  The absence of participatory checks on the executive branch of 
government in the region can tentatively at least in part be ascribed to the high volume of 
aid governments receive.   Indeed, the relationship with the donors may well have served 
to reinforce tendencies which other structural factors were already creating.  Many early 
observers had noted the low levels of participation in African political systems following 
independence (Kasfir, 1971; Collier, 1982), while the tendency of these countries to 
produce highly presidential political systems, with powerful executives and impotent 
legislatures has also long been related in the literature (Schatzberg, 2001; Bratton and van 
de Walle, 1997).   The weakness of civil society in the region has also been described by 
numerous observers (Ndegwa, 1995; Harbeson et al., 1994). 
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To be sure, political systems with stronger traditions of both vertical and horizontal 
domestic accountability might have been affected differently by a large volume of aid.  
But in Africa’s post-colonial regimes, these aid flows inevitably enhanced an evolution 
already under way.  Poorly integrated political communities with substantial ethnic 
fragmentation, and a small (or non-existent) middle class to buttress democratic rule were 
more likely to fall prey to authoritarian rulers relying on clientelism to remain in power.  
A small number of countries, such as Botswana, avoided the worst of these pitfalls 
(Acemoglu et al, 2003; Lewis, 1993), in part thanks to unusual leadership.  But for most 
the post-independence period was characterized by the emergence of regimes that 
enjoyed little popular legitimacy and needed a combination of systematic clientelism and 
various repressive political instruments to remain in power.  These types of regimes were 
comforted in these tendencies by steady increases in aid that seemed automatic 
throughout the 1970s and 1980s.   Governments could undertake profoundly anti-
developmental actions and not threaten their relationship with the western donors.   Thus, 
the move to authoritarian and military government in the 1960s did not reduce aid.  The 
replacement of independent civil service commissions and merit-based promotions by 
politicized presidential control of the civil service was similarly condoned, not least 
because donors found it convenient to rely on a large number of foreign experts, to 
palliate weaknesses in the civil service (Berg, 1993).  Disastrous nationalization of 
private firms owned by foreigners for the benefit of political cronies close to the president 
in countries as diverse as Nigeria and Zaire did not prevent aid to continue its upward 
trajectory  (See Rood, 1976;  Callaghy, 1984 on Zaire; Biersteker, 1987 on Nigeria).   
 
A comparison with the historical experience in the West is instructive here.  Much 
scholarly work has closely linked democratic development to the evolution of taxation 
(see Ross, 2004 for an excellent overview).  Historians of the emergence of strong 
democratic states in the West emphasize the link between the progressive growth of 
democratic and accountable government, on the one hand, and the emergence of a state 
apparatus that had both the capacity and the legitimacy to extract an increasing amount of 
revenue from society, on the other.  In an influential essay, North and Weingast (1989) 
showed that the emergence of Parliamentary sovereignty in Britain with the Glorious 
Revolution of 1688 dramatically increased the ability of the British government to raise 
taxes, and ensured the country’s military and economic success in the 18th and 19th 
century.  
 
Ardant (1975) showed that the European states that were able to finance and then win 
wars were the states that were able to build their extractive capacity, but also to gain the 
assent of their populations, often by extending political rights. In Tilly’s famous aphorism, 
“the state made war and war made the state”, the need to finance wars motivated states 
both to build their extractive capacity, but also to maintain their own legitimacy (Tilly, 
1975, 1985).  In short, taxation is important because it is essential to democratic 
governance, but also because it holds the key to state building and state survival. The 
comparison with the low income countries in Africa is instructive, since they did not have 
to fight international wars to ensure their survival (Herbst, 2000; Jackson and Rotberg, 
1982).  
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In the 20th and 21st centuries, the basic functions of a developmental low-income state are 
to raise revenues and make effective expenditures in order to promote development.  
Successful developing countries—Korea, Taiwan, Botswana—have typically been 
solidly extractive states, with above average tax effort ratios.   Not all of these states have 
enjoyed democratic governance during the early phases of their development, but almost 
invariably, their governments enjoyed substantial political legitimacy, and none were 
highly repressive.  Of course, most of the low–income states of Africa typically have low 
tax effort ratios.  
 
In recent years, donors have financed a sharp increase in social services provision in sub-
Saharan Africa, notably in health and education.  Historically, such increases in provision 
have been the hallmark of democratic governments, or at least of governments facing 
substantial participatory pressures.  Thus, in the West, the rise of public education 
coincided in general terms with the introduction of the electoral franchise.  Pressures 
from below encouraged governments who wanted to remain in power to provide more 
services to its citizens.  In most African countries, however, the pressures have been 
external.  In fact, a substantial proportion of the national development effort is not 
integrated into the national budget and does not concern the government.  It is not 
uncommon for donors to fund over half of the country’s public investment budget, while 
foreign NGOs with their local partners can be providing from a third to half of the social 
services available to African citizens in some countries (Semboja and Therkildsen, 1995). 
Indeed, somewhat ironically, African governments have found it politically convenient to 
blame the donors and NGOs for unpopular sectoral policies, poor social services and 
negative economic outcomes, as if these were not among their core responsibilities.  
 
There are similar differences in the rise of civil society.  In the West, an emerging middle 
class sought to build a counter-weight to the state and its organizations, and the result was 
a wide variety of membership organizations, unions and clubs with an independent basis 
of power, that with time were able to increase the accountability of the central state (Hall, 
1995).   In Africa, the absence of economic growth long undermined the development of 
an indigenous independent civil society.  In recent years, there has been a flowering of 
small non-state actors and some of them were instrumental in the emergence of 
democratic movements that did topple some authoritarian governments in the early 1990s 
(Bratton and van de Walle, 1997; Harbeson et al., 1994).  Yet, there remain very few 
membership organizations in the region, and many of the bigger NGOs that have 
emerged are mostly funded by the donors, typically to help undertake donor initiatives in 
the social sectors.  Because these organizations receive funding from the donors, they are 
less likely to seek to build up their own memberships, or autonomy.  Because they help 
donors implement projects that governments fail to undertake, they actually help 
governments escape accountability for their developmental failures.         
 
As a result of these different dynamics, governments have escaped accountability and 
have been allowed to focus their resources on non-developmental expenditures that help 
them remain in office. Van de Walle (2001) shows that there have been substantial 
increases in the size of defense expenditures in the region for instance, and the number 
and size of public offices such as parliamentary bodies, ministerial cabinets, national 
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commissions, and provincial governments have steadily risen through two decades of 
economic crisis, even as the share of aid in the funding of development has sharply 
increased.  
Paradoxically, as a result, in Africa, the extension of social services has often been 
accompanied by a decline of participation, low governance quality and an increase in 
clientelistic behavior.  If we agree with Fox (1994) and others that the process of 
democratic consolidation in low-income states requires a transition from clientelism to 
citizenship, in which governments engage in participatory contractual exchange 
relationships with the population, then donors efforts may have paradoxically negative 
effects on citizen-government relations in the region.   
 
 
7.   Conclusions 
 
Our review of the literature suggests that there are reasons to believe that a large and 
sustained volume of aid can have negative effects on the development of good public 
institutions in low income countries.  We have reviewed different bodies of literature that 
suggest that the current aid system may have undercut incentives for revenue collection 
and negatively affected public governance in Africa.  In addition, we have examined a 
political science literature that finds both anti-development governance patterns across 
most of sub-Saharan Africa and strong historical evidence that revenue generation is 
central to the idea of accountability and the establishment of state institutions.  Combined, 
they suggest that aid may undermine the development of effective state structures. 
  
There are many gaps in the data needed to prove these tentative claims.  Also, state 
revenues are an imperfect indicator for state capacity, since states are able to get revenues 
in many different ways, only some of which involve much extractive capacity.  
Nonetheless, the analysis does suggest that an aid-institutions paradox, whereby high 
levels of aid can have a negative effect on local institutions, is a potentially serious 
concern.  Given the possibility for substantially more aid flowing to Africa in the near 
future, scope for such a harmful dynamic is likely to be exacerbated. 
 
A quarter of a century ago, the World Bank issued its so-called Berg Report (World Bank, 
1981), which called for a doubling of aid to address its many economic and social 
problems. It must be particularly distressing to the development community how many of 
those problems persist, despite the fact that increases in aid were considerably higher than 
those hoped.  This fact alone should encourage skepticism about the current proposals 
that a sharp increase in aid volume will have the intended effects in the region.  It is not at 
all clear that the current aid practices – with the negative effects on institutions described 
above – will or can be reformed. But, as we have argued, there are good reasons to 
believe that high levels of aid over a prolonged period is likely to have negative 
institutional effects, at the very least, if the current aid delivery modalities are not 
substantially reformed.  
 
How much is too much aid?  We have studiously avoided this difficult question until the 
end of the paper.  The same Berg (1997, 2000) suggested that aid starts to have negative 
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effects on local institutions when aid flows reach 5 percent of GDP, which would mean 
that the overwhelming majority of states in the region are negatively affected.  A more 
recent and thorough review of aid absorption (Clemens and Radelet, 2003) find the 
‘saturation point’ (where additional aid would produce zero economic impact) highly 
dependent on local conditions, but ranging from 15-45 percent of GDP.  Surely, the 
incentive dynamics raised by this easy come into play well before such an extreme level 
is reached.   
 
Our analysis is in no way meant to disparage the desirability of general increases in aid 
flows, however, or suggest that additional aid could not necessarily be spent without 
producing the negative institutional effects.  Our findings do not cover a range of 
activities that might be donor financed which could have positive institutional effects, 
such as debt relief, peacekeeping, and regional security arrangements.  Similarly, we join 
other analysts who have advocated substantial increases in funding for regional and 
global public goods, such as agricultural research or anti-malaria research.  All the 
available evidence on the likely impact of the eradication of endemic diseases in the 
region suggest current funding levels to be inadequate (Ferroni and Mody, 2002), and a 
substantially larger flow of resources would be unlikely to have the kinds of negative 
institutional effects described here.  
 
In sum, it seems likely that the extra public dollars now being proposed for traditional 
development assistance might well be better spent for other types of assistance that would 
in the long run have a greater impact on the development of the region.  However, an 
historical view of the complex evolution of state institutions suggests that not only are 
they critical to producing developmental outcomes, but that donors should be 
unambiguously aware that their assistance can have perverse effects on some of the very 
outcomes they hope to encourage. 
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